THE MORAL PHILOSOPHY OF ASA SHINN
Northeastern Seminary (Rochester, NY)
The first full-length defense of the Wesleyan message,
published in America, was Asa Shinn’s An Essay on the Plan of Salvation,
a treatise that The History of American Methodism calls “profoundly
reflective.”[1] However, Shinn’s Essay has scarcely
been appreciated for its significance and at times has been misunderstood. Charles Rogers, surveying the development of
an “indigenous American Methodist theology,” read Shinn’s Essay as a
systematic theology.
It is an important book primarily because it stands as
the systematic expression of theological views which were present in the
official doctrinal standards and which were worked out in the business of
itinerant preaching in America. It is
important also because it contributed to the further development of Methodist
theology, particularly through its influence on such men as Nathan Bangs and
Daniel D. Whedon, as well as on countless numbers of preachers.[2]
At
the conclusion of his discussion on Shinn’s Essay, Rogers expressed
difficulty reading this treatise as a “systematic theology”: “There may be some question whether
this is an accurate representation of the thought of John Wesley on these
matters. What it does represent is the
way in which American Methodists, in their own historical context, were coming
to understand Wesleyanism.”[3] However, read as a “systematic theology,”
Shinn’s Essay can scarcely be called an exposition of Wesley’s
thought–indeed, it rarely mentions Wesley.
However, the Essay was a vigorous attack on the enemies of early
American Methodism, and a passionate defense of Arminianism and
republicanism. Shinn enhanced the Essay’s
effectiveness by casting it in the form of a moral philosophy–a treatise on the
nature of Truth in the natural law tradition.
He drew his arguments from a multitude of scholarly resources and thus
provided preachers with an array of arguments to silence the critics on their
circuits, identify with republicanism and commend Methodism. For the sake of brevity, this article will
discuss only the Essay’s response to philosophical skepticism.
Publishing his Essay in 1813, Shinn borrowed
extensively from British and Scottish moral philosophy (a line which stretched
from the Third Earl of Shaftesbury, through Samuel Clarke, Francis Hutcheson,
and Thomas Reid) and continued the philosophical tradition that had critiqued
the associationism of Thomas Hobbes for more than a century.[4] Extensive citations from contemporary
sources in the Essay’s arguments, pieced together by ridicule and
rhetoric, indicate that Shinn read widely in the theological and philosophical
debates of his day. He probably
composed the Essay as a resource for Methodist circuit riders challenged
by hecklers on their circuits–a repository of rhetoric which shored up
Christian orthodoxy against the onslaught of philosophical skepticism which
threatened early America. In this
capacity, the Essay reflects the theological and philosophical issues
encountered by early American Methodist circuit riders.
Although the Essay claimed to be objective,
Shinn filled its 416 pages with passionate conviction and querulous controversy
with his opponents. He stated in his defense that “the author, from the
beginning to the end, has been governed by a conviction that he ought to follow
evidence wherever it should lead, without ever suppressing or departing from
any part of it, through the fear of deviating from the sentiments of any man,
or any number of men in the world.”[5] Shinn gave no quarter to dissenting
perspectives, especially “infidelity” [philosophical skepticism], “popery” [Roman Catholicism], and
“antinomian divinity” [Calvinism].
Convinced that the right use of reason and common sense would dispel the
fogs of doctrinal error, Shinn urged his readers to exercise their minds and
inquire deeply into the nature of true religion: “Let all men thus use their reason, and the religion of the Lord
Jesus Christ will rise like the sun in the midst of heaven, and chase the dark
mists of error from mankind.”[6] The right exercise of human faculties would
promote human happiness, the chief end of knowledge.[7] The desire for happiness is an innate
tendency that proceeds from the natural faculties of humanity; however, the
means to happiness are widely varied, and people must obtain knowledge to find
happiness. Knowledge comes through the
natural faculties within each person (“common sense”) and reason, as well as
through divine revelation.[8]
In his first section of the Essay, Shinn
examined the means that God has ordained to distinguish between truth and
falsehood, a means held by all people (in their right mind).[9] God has implanted in humanity an innate
sense of right and wrong, by which people can intuitively perceive the
distinction between truth and falsehood.[10] This innate sense provides the capacity to
distinguish “first principles,” or “self-evident truths,” which do not require
the exercise of reason–their truthfulness is immediately apparent to the mind.[11] Shinn’s realism is set forth in his
definition of truth: “By the word truth, in its general application, I
understand those propositions, or decisions of the judgment, which accord with
the real existence, properties and relations of all things: those which do not
thus accord with real existence, properties and relations, are false.”[12] Restating the philosophy of Thomas Reid,
Shinn affirmed the existence of an external world independent of the mind and
the sense data it receives. Later in
the essay, Shinn railed against “sophists” and other philosophers in the line
of George Berkeley and David Hume, who questioned or even denied the existence
of a world external to the mind, affirming only the reality of ideas.[13] Appropriating Reid’s ‘common sense’ realism,
Shinn’s epistemology relied on innate faculties of the experiencing self, and
rejected the associationism of Hobbes.[14] Like Reid, Shinn affirmed both the material
world and the validity of belief in an age of skepticism–in effect, making room
for Christian supernaturalism.
Shinn’s epistemology depended on “evidence” as the
ground of Truth, and the degree of evidence manifested in perception regulated
the degree of certainty of truth ascertained.[15] This dependence characterized the empiricism
of Bacon, Locke, Hutcheson, and Reid, and constituted the foundation of
knowledge.[16] As Broaddus points out, moral sense theory
was based on empiricism applied to moral philosophy. She states, “Empirical philosophers held in common the assumption
that all knowledge stems from sense experience and that, indeed, sense
experience is the only valid basis for maintaining any proposition as a matter
of fact.” According to Broaddus, Bacon
“articulates the foundation of empiricism,” that knowledge comes through
observation of particulars, and generalizing about the world only on the basis
of those observations. This forms the
basis of scientific investigation, but does not rule out the validity of
“metaphysical truth.” Broaddus
emphasizes, “His intent was not to reject the latter, but rather to have
inductive empiricism serve as guide for the former [scientific investigation].”
In
Bacon’s worldview, God created the universe then left it to run itself. .
. Following this perception of God,
natural law and natural philosophy become manifestations of God’s work. Thus scientists and philosophers after Bacon
began to study nature, not as an end in itself, but more as a means to
understanding God’s design in the world.[17]
Moral
philosophy thus consisted of a systematic, empirical investigation of the world
and the operations of the mind to discover the design of the universe and
construct a pattern for life. Since
moral philosophy united disparate fields under a common epistemology, its
ambition for a ‘systematic’ perspective forced the rhetorical harmonization of
knowledge. This harmonization reassured
the immutability of morality when the latter was threatened by the dissolution
of knowledge—the breakup of the God-centered universe--and enabled clergy,
scientists and philosophers to incorporate new knowledge into a God-centered
universe—but which God-centered universe?
Catholic? Reformed? Arminian?
Deist? While Reformed
theologians could accept the inductive empiricism of the scientific revolution,
they rejected deism/skepticism as a basis for morality. Arminians could brook neither the
deism/skepticism nor the predestinarian views common among Scottish
philosophers. And neither Reformed nor
Arminian could accept a Catholic universe.
As a Methodist/Arminian, Shinn attacked skepticism, Catholicism and
Calvinism, and set forth a common-sense epistemology against all these forms of
“deceit.”
Shinn’s ‘scientific’ methodology–his empirical,
inductive approach to the world–required several assumptions about
epistemology. This becomes apparent in
his discussion of evidence as “testimony, experience, and clear
demonstration.” He states that while
the term “evidence” eludes precise definition, “there is something” in evidence
“that is naturally calculated to produce belief or conviction in an intelligent
being that the thing thus proved is true: and this something which naturally
tends to produce belief or conviction is what we mean by evidence.”[18] Shinn also assumed that the natural
faculties of humanity–the senses–are a reliable means of knowledge–that human
perception faithfully transmits an accurate picture of the world. Since these faculties have been implanted in
humanity by God the Creator, to doubt the reliability of human perception is to
cast aspersion on God. For Shinn, it
was inconceivable that God would plant faulty means of perception in
humanity–on this score, humanity could not be held morally accountable, since
people would be unable to distinguish between truth and falsehood, and thus
between right and wrong. This was
impossible, because Shinn understood God’s nature–not as sovereignty, as in
Calvinism–but as moral goodness, manifested to humanity in the form of
benevolence.[19] This was a major pillar for Shinn’s
argument–on the basis of God’s benevolence, human faculties are trustworthy
means by which the world is known.
These trustworthy faculties rest on immutable moral principles that
stand prior to reason: (1) “There is one kind of conduct that is right and
another kind that is wrong.” (2) “Right and wrong are opposite to each other,
and it is impossible that they should be the same.” (3) “All mankind ought to
do that which is right, and to avoid doing that which is wrong.” (4) “That conduct which tends to promote
general happiness is right, and that which tends to promote general misery is
wrong.”[20] On this basis, Shinn affirmed that any
person, in his/her right mind, with his/her hand on one’s heart and an open
Bible in front of oneself, casting off tradition and adherence to a creed or
party, could come to knowledge of the Truth–especially truth about morality.[21] Although he appears to refute skepticism
about sensation, especially Hume’s skepticism, Shinn never rose to the level of
Hume’s philosophical arguments.[22] Rather, Shinn’s arguments bolster thinking
at the ‘plebian’ level–the understanding of everyday life–and affirmed the
ability of common people to think for themselves.[23] Shinn’s Essay may have sounded
convincing to people of “good sense,” but his arguments required numerous
assumptions that people often make about everyday life.[24] Shinn was doubtless a brilliant thinker and
writer, whose arguments could win the day in a public debate, but his
‘evidence’ assumed too much at the level of belief.[25] This is the weakest point of Scottish
realism–the assumption of the trustworthiness of everyday life. In the minds of
common people, the arguments in Shinn’s Essay solidly refuted
skepticism; however, the Essay addressed these issues by drawing
selections from the Bible and contemporary resources, and re-casting these
selections in terms of Scottish realism as a strategy to eliminate doubt. This elimination of doubt would establish
the immutability of morals by the re-affirmation of a God-centered world. Although the Essay is deeply rooted
in Methodist piety, Shinn’s strategy introduced a strong rationalistic
character into the Wesleyan tradition.[26] This strategy linked an assumed
trustworthiness of sensation with an assumed trustworthiness of religious
experience, and provided Wesleyan theology with a philosophical foundation that
had widespread currency. Shinn’s Essay
answered the skeptics splendidly–as long as the fortunes of Scottish realism
held out—by ridiculing their ‘infidelity’ and commending the Truth about the
God-centered universe.
Reinforcing his arguments, Shinn provided three tests
of the truth of first principles (see note 23 below), including the following:
“A degree of credit is due to human testimony (Shinn’s emphasis).” He then employed his argument ad absurdum,
where the opposite of a proposed first principle is assumed to be true, and
demonstrated to be a “chain of manifest absurdities.” He applied this “truth by falsification” to the commonplace
taking of human testimony for granted, and skillfully turned the argument into
sharply contrasting alternatives, one of which would be readily accepted, and
another which would be immediately rejected for its absurdity. Shinn used this rhetorical tool throughout
his essay, and in this instance he demonstrated the absurdity of the person who
refused to give any credit to human testimony.[27] This manner of argument probably convinced
most readers of the Essay; however, this rhetoric never directly
answered the skepticism of Hume, since its most likely purpose was to help
Methodist ministers win converts on their circuits. The sharp division between truth and absurdity was at the same
time the Essay’s strength–and weakness.
This strength-and-weakness was based on the epistemological foundation
of Shinn’s Essay–that any person in his/her right mind could comprehend
“first principles” if these principles were held up in a clear light. The use of terms like “self-evident” may
have sounded convincing to readers disposed to accept them uncritically, but
Shinn’s agenda was distinctly Methodist, Arminian, and democratic–most likely
aimed at Methodist ministers favorably disposed toward republicanism. Shinn’s argument reflected a style, common
in the debating societies of this period, which Broaddus calls “epideictic
rhetoric.” This type of rhetoric reinforced one’s own position by portraying an
opponent’s as absurd.[28] The critical reader can observe Shinn
warming up to this technique in the following statement, regarding the
Aristotelian logic he employs in his Essay: “From what has been said, it
is plain that all our reasonings must ultimately be founded, either upon self-evident
truths, upon manifest falsehoods, or upon hypotheses, which
have been invented by the flights of imagination and conjecture (Shinn’s
emphasis).”[29] Shinn prepared his readers to accept these
premises–and consequently his argument, and to reject all positions that
allegedly did not stand on self-evident principles (especially those of Hume,
Berkeley, Paine, Calvin, and ‘Rome’). Shinn
urged his readers to think for themselves and reject authoritarian systems such
as Catholicism.[30] He encouraged them to accept thinking which
seemed intuitively correct, especially when discussing one of the major
epistemological questions of the eighteenth century–the nature of ideas. Shinn rejected the notion that ideas have a
separate existence apart from human thought, and embraced the proposition that
sense perception is immediately apparent to the human mind. He contrasted the two positions in two
columns, side-by-side: (1) “God has given us the sense of seeing and hearing,
and other senses, whereby we immediately perceive many external objects, with
an immediate conviction of their present existence.” (2) “By the sense of
seeing, hearing, feeling, tasting and smelling, we perceive nothing but ideas
in our brain; and all the knowledge we can have, of any thing in the world,
is by inference from the ideas which we perceive.” Then he appealed to his readers’ common
sense and prejudice:
Which
of these positions are we to receive as an axiom of truth, on which to build
a
system? Which of the two appears to
stand most in need of argument to prove it?
Is it
enough
for a man to tell us, very gravely, that the first is a vulgar error, and the
other is
altogether
philosophical? So would his holiness,
in St. Peter’s chair, inform us, that we
must
contradict our senses, and believe that a piece of bread is really a god,
otherwise we
are
vulgar heretics that have no just ideas of the true divinity.[31]
Shinn
referred his readers to Dr. Reid’s Essays, vol. 1, p. 205, and stated,
“All I have to do with the matter, is to illustrate the difference between a
first principle and an hypothesis, as the proper ground of reasoning.” He then pursued his argument ad absurdum
and pointed out Dr. Reid’s philosophy as providing astronomy with a “solid
foundation”–“then navigators and surveyors of land are really measuring the
parts of an external universe, and are not employed in marking the distance of
one idea from another in their brains (Shinn’s emphasis).” Shinn ridiculed idealism by remarking that
the “husbandman, when following his plow, is really making a furrow upon solid
ground, and not upon an idea in his brain.”
On the contrary, “if he had ‘but the slightest philosophy,’ it seems,
this universal and primary notion of all men would soon be destroyed.”[32]
Shinn
was willing to concede that ideas “may serve as an instrument or medium of
perception,” but ideas could never “usurp the place of other things,” namely
the material universe “which God has created.”[33] For Shinn, people perceive real objects in
an external universe, and they perceive the objects themselves, not ideas of
those objects. His intention was to
eliminate doubt in human knowledge, not only in the material world, but in spiritual
matters as well. Shinn cited Thomas
Reid’s reference to John Locke as the source of the teaching “‘that all the
immediate objects of human knowledge, are ideas in the mind.’” He then pointed
out that “Bishop Berkeley, proceeding upon this foundation, demonstrated very
easily, that there is no material world” while still affirming the existence of
spiritual entities. In contrast, Hume
“adopts the theory of ideas in its full extent: and, in consequence, shows that
there is neither matter nor mind in the universe; nothing but impressions and
ideas. What we call a body, is only a
bundle of sensations; and what we call the mind, is only a bundle of thoughts,
passions, and emotions, without any subjects.”
Shinn joined Reid in dismissing these speculations that, “together with
the fantasms of Popery,” often brought reproach on the exercise of reason. Shinn did not discourage the use of reason,
but deplored the misapplication of reason to hypotheses and conjectures.[34] Reason could build a ‘scientific’ basis for
moral philosophy only through Baconian induction.[35] These statements indicate that Shinn
borrowed his arguments, including his criticism of Berkeley and Hume, mostly
from Thomas Reid. Berkeley and Hume, as
well as Locke, had answered and extended the naturalistic philosophy of Thomas
Hobbes, in which human society was a selfish struggle for equilibrium. Shinn joined Thomas Reid, Samuel Clarke and
a host of lesser-known philosophers and clergy who tried to shore up the
traditional Christian perspective. These British and Scottish philosophers
beheld the universe as “single harmonious system and that in one way or another
no serious disharmony need be expected between observed events and preferred
values.”[36] Nothing could ultimately be disharmonious, for
God was Creator and Sustainer of all.
Truth was a seamless robe that could not be torn asunder through
experimental scientific methods, and any alleged disparity in truth(s) was
attributed to human ignorance.
According to Vereker, to maintain this harmonious vision these
philosophers had to interpret God and the world in rationalistic, philosophical
terms, rather than in traditional, incarnational terms. The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
witnessed a spreading influence of deistic thinking, the result of “divorce and
dismemberment” between God and nature, reason and revelation. This crisis of
authority prompted clergy and philosophers to answer the “skeptics” in
Aristotelian terms and construct a comprehensive vision of reality in light of
scientific discovery, the spread of naturalism and rejection of Christian
doctrines.[37] This unified vision of reality was vital for
the support of universal standards for morality, and as Vereker points out,
“Authority for a universal standard must derive either from reason or
revelation.”[38] For Shinn, authority for universal standards
of morality stood on reason and revelation, a bulwark of Christian Truth
against skepticism.
Shinn’s discussion of revelation follows Reid, who saw
revelation as an extension of reason.
For Shinn, God is the author of sense perception just as surely as God
is the author of revelation, with the exception that the person to whom the
revelation has been given is aware that the communication of information has
been divinely given.[39] Sense perception and revelation work
together in a harmonious relationship, since God is the author of both. Faith in the credibility of sense perception
is required as well as faith in the truthfulness of revelation, and the person
who discredits the former cannot be expected to believe the latter.[40] Shinn shared Reid’s commitment to
empiricism, even to the point of applying empiricist principles to the
‘revealed data’ provided by divine revelation.
Faith in the trustworthiness of sense perception (empiricism) was
equivocated with the kind of faith required for the reception of divine
revelation. This rhetorical bridge in
Shinn’s Essay placed the everyday data of sense perception on the same
plane as religious knowledge–the same kind of faith was required for both kinds
of knowledge. These rhetorical devices
formed the cornerstone of argument for a harmonious universe among
eighteenth-century divines, and sounded convincing in a world accustomed to
speaking of God, even in scientific matters.
Shinn took his argument for the truth of divine revelation directly from
Reid’s defense of the trustworthiness of sense perception. Discussing the example of Paul’s knowledge
of the storm and his “revealed knowledge” of the outcome, Shinn affirmed both
kinds of knowledge as grounded in the character of God.[41] Like other Christian moral philosophers with
an eighteenth-century understanding of the universe, including William Paley,
Shinn argued that since God was the author of both natural phenomena and
supernatural revelation, to assume trustworthiness of the one was to assume the
trustworthiness of the other.[42] Distrust of divine revelation calls into
question the reliability of all human faculties, and such distrust “saps the
foundation of all human knowledge, and at once precipitates us into the dark
chaos, among the atoms and blind goddesses of atheism.”[43] God was the Author of all truth, and had
implanted the means for knowing Truth within humanity. To doubt the means of knowledge was to cast
aspersion on the divine Author, undercut the foundations of knowledge, and
launch the doubter into the “fogs” of atheism and skepticism. For Shinn, the rejection of God’s appointed
means of human knowledge was nothing less than the atheism and skepticism of
associationism. The impassioned tone of
the Essay reveals an intense concern to dispel the doubts of the reader
and to discredit skepticism, a mood that had considerable provenance in early
America.[44] Since Shinn had substantial experience as a
Methodist circuit rider and leader, his principal concern may have been to
furnish arguments against the skepticism commonly encountered by Methodist
preachers on their circuits. And
because Shinn had been stationed in remote rural circuits early in his career,
such intense concern may reveal how deeply imbedded skepticism had become in
the minds of ordinary Americans.
However, his Essay does not seem to be directly addressed to
common folk; rather, the Essay was most likely written as an
apologetical resource for Methodist ministers.
This is apparent from the high regard the Essay accords to Wesley
and Fletcher, as well as other ‘divines’ widely read by Methodist
ministers. Shinn appealed to the
prejudices of his Methodist readers when he lumped together Christian
philosophers and Methodist leaders who supported the traditional authority of
the Bible, over against the “enemies” of Christianity who doubted its
truth. He named prominent scientists,
philosophers and divines as belonging to the “wisest and best”–and overlooked
the significant differences among them.
Across the divide from this company of the faithful Shinn placed the
enemies of the Bible—Hobbes, Bolingbroke, Gibbon, Hume, Voltaire, Paine and
Palmer—and stated that it was no wonder that the Bible could not withstand the
test of their philosophy, since “earth and sea, animals and vegetable, the
bodies and souls of men [sic], and the very heavens themselves, could not
withstand the test. We must have a revelation made up of nothing but ideas and
impressions, before it will stand the test of the metaphysical philosophy.”[45]
Repeated in the sermons of Methodist ministers, these ‘arguments’ probably
induced gales of laughter at the ‘folly’ of idealism. Through the judicious application of ridicule and appeal to
common sense, Shinn turned the Enlightenment’s critique of Christianity on its
head and encouraged doubt and skepticism toward philosophical idealism and
unbelief.
Most of the remainder of the Essay consists of
a polemic against “antinomian divinity” (Calvinism) and includes an eloquent
exposition of the moral government theory of the atonement.[46] The Essay also addresses the
suffering, death and eternal destiny of infants (a significant pastoral issue
in early America), and concludes with a remarkable portrait of faith. This
portrait pleads for a balanced Christian life that includes not only emotion,
but also reason and intelligence.[47]
Shinn rejected feelings as “the standard of religion” since feelings alone
could not regulate the Christian life, particularly with respect to
morals. His analysis of emotionalism
stemmed directly from his experience as a minister, especially with people who
were dying in great pain. He aimed his
sharpest critiques against rampant emotionalism, a common problem among early
Methodists.[48] Shinn displayed a remarkable balance in his
portrait of the Christian life, provided insights from both the Enlightenment
and the Evangelical Revival, and critiqued the former by the latter and the
latter by the former. His Essay
astutely and passionately addressed the theological issues and pastoral
concerns of early Methodist ministers and provided them with resources to
establish a faithful, biblical Christianity that was intellectually and
emotionally satisfying in the republicanism of young America.
[1]Asa Shinn, An Essay on the Plan of Salvation: In Which
the Several Sources of Evidence are Examined, and Applied to the Interesting
Doctrine of Redemption, in Its Relation to the Government and Moral Attributes
of the Deity. Baltimore, MD: Neal,
Wills and Cole, 1813; The History of American Methodism, 1:343. For biographical information on Shinn from
primary source material, see Thomas H. Colhouer, Sketches of the Founders of
the Methodist Protestant Church and Its Bibliography (Pittsburgh, 1880);
Cornelius Cooke, Discourse on the Life and Death of the Rev. Asa Shinn
(Pittsburgh, 1853); for a contemporary defense of the Methodist Reform
movement, see R. F. Shinn, A Tribute to Our Fathers: Being a Vindication of
the Founders of the Methodist Protestant Church (Cincinnati, OH: Applegate
& Co., and Baltimore, MD: Methodist Protestant Book Concern, 1853). For secondary treatment, see The History
of American Methodism (1964), vol. 1; and William R. Sutton, Journeymen
for Jesus: Evangelical Artisans Confront Capitalism in Jacksonian Baltimore (University
Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998). Shinn was a leading advocate of Methodist Reform in the early
nineteenth century and became one of the founders of the Methodist Protestant
Church.
[2]Charles A. Rogers, “The Theological Heritage of the Early
Methodist Preachers,” Duke Divinity School Review 34 (Autumn 1969),
203. For Shinn’s influence, Rogers
refers his readers to Nathan Bangs, Errors of Hopkinsianism Detected and
Refuted (New York: J. C. Totten, 1815) and Daniel D. Whedon, Freedom of
the Will as a Basis of Human Responsibility (New York: Eaton and Mains,
1864).
[3]Rogers, “The Theological Heritage of the Early
Methodist Preachers,” 205.
[4]For a discussion of seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century Scottish philosophers as moral educators, see Dorothy C.
Broaddus, “Moral Sense Theory in the History of Rhetoric,” (Ph.D. diss.,
University of Louisville, 1989), 50.
[5]Shinn, An Essay on the Plan of Salvation,
preface [n.p.].
[6]Shinn, Essay on the Plan of Salvation,
170. Shinn may have appropriated this
perspective from John Locke, whose moderate position affirmed reason as the
criterion by which to judge the veracity of revelation. Rem Edwards observes that this position
differs from the eighteenth century deists who rejected revelation as a source
of knowledge. See Rem B. Edwards, A
Return to Moral and Religious Philosophy in Early America (Washington, DC:
University Press of America, 1982), 90-91.
Shinn was also influenced by Samuel Clarke and other ethical
rationalists, whose concern for reason as the sole source for morality arose
from their insistence that moral principles were immutable and eternal. Ethical rationalists despised Hobbes,
especially since the latter made morality depend on “the will of the sovereign
power.” See Frederick C. Beiser, The
Sovereignty of Reason: The Defense of Rationality in the Early English
Enlightenment (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996),
266-269. However, Shinn’s Essay
relies more on intuition (as with Hutcheson and Reid) than reason as the principal
means of religious knowledge. The Essay
has obviously been drawn from disparate sources, such as Samuel Clarke, and
Shinn’s appropriation of Clarke’s appeal to “self-evidence” is clear. Mackie calls Clarke’s style of argument “a
balloon of rhetoric,” and this style characterizes Shinn’s Essay. See J. L. Mackie, Hume’s Moral Theory
(London and New York: Routledge, 1980), 18.
According to Gauvreau, the Moderate Enlightenment’s insistence on reason
as the criterion of revelation was rejected by John Wesley under the influence
of John Hutchinson, “who denied the possibility of a natural theology in the
sense understood by Newton and his supporters.” Hutchinson asserted the priority of divine revelation in the Bible
that “contained the true description of nature’s processes.” Gauvreau cites Richard Watson on this point,
stating that “inquiries concerning the divine nature. . must depend exclusively
upon revelation.” Michael Gauvreau,
“The Empire of Evangelicalism: Varieties of Common Sense in Scotland, Canada
and the United States,” in Evangelicalism: Comparative Studies of Popular
Protestantism in North America, the British Isles, and Beyond, 1700-1990,
ed. Mark A. Noll, David W. Bebbington and George A Rawlyk (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1994), 239. According
to footnote 106 (page 251), the citation of Watson comes from his Theological
Institutes I:334-335. Shinn’s
“un-Wesleyan” turn should be credited to the polemics of the American
intellectual environment, in which Shinn and other Methodists had to battle
widespread philosophical skepticism.
Randy Maddox has attributed the scarce mention of Wesley in the Essay
to Shinn’s primitivism. This may have
been a factor, but the most likely reason was the polemical environment in
America. See Randy L. Maddox,
“Respected Founder/Neglected Guide: The Role of Wesley in American Methodist
Theology,” Methodist History 37:2 (January 1999), 74. Maddox made a similar point at the “Wesleyan
Studies Teach-In” held at Colgate Rochester Divinity School (Rochester, NY), 22
September 2000.
[7]Shinn, Essay on the Plan of Salvation, vi-vii.
[8]The Enlightenment affirmed the competence of
individuals to “think for themselves,” apart from authoritarian institutions,
and on this point Shinn imbibed the essence of the Enlightenment outlook. According to Kinast, the Enlightenment
encouraged (1) a “turn to the subject” (individualism) and (2) critical
thinking. The “turn to the subject” “represents
the Enlightenment’s rebellion against what it perceived as excessive control of
individuals by the prevailing institutions of the time–the monarchy, the
Church, and the wealthy. Instead of
conforming to the authority and decisions of these institutions . . the
Enlightenment urged every person to think and act for themselves.” Robert L. Kinast, Making Faith-Sense:
Theological Reflection in Everyday Life (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical
Press, 2000), x.
[9]Shinn, Essay on the Plan of Salvation, ix.
[10]For an excellent study of the natural law tradition
see J. Budziszewski, Written on the Heart: The Case for Natural Law
(Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1997).
[11]Shinn, Essay on the Plan of Salvation, 11. Shinn’s drew his understanding of “first
principles” from Thomas Reid. “Reid’s
theory of common sense is based on what he calls ‘first principles,’ a term
first used by Aristotle. Reid’s ‘first
principles’ are given to humans by God and thus do not require any
justification or reasoning about them.
Broaddus, “Moral Sense Theory in the History of Rhetoric,” 79.
[12]Shinn, Essay on the Plan of Salvation, 12.
[13]An excellent summary of Reid’s “common sense” realism
can be found in Allen Jayne, Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence:
Origins, Philosophy and Theology (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky
Press, 1998), 92-98.
[14]“Reid’s philosophical aim is to destroy the skepticism
of Hume and the idealism of Berkeley without destroying empiricism.” Broaddus, “Moral Sense Theory in the History
of Rhetoric,” 76. Broaddus adds on
pages 76-77, “Reid’s statements about Hume’s philosophy more aptly apply to the
philosophy of the Anglican Bishop George Berkeley. While Hume argues that we
have no evidence and no apparatus for reasoning beyond our own experience,
Berkeley denies that the material world exists.” Broaddus concludes on page 77, “Thus Reid attacks two
philosophical positions, both of which rely on empiricism for their arguments:
skepticism, which admits nothing except that which can be known directly
through sense experience, and idealism, which admits nothing of material
substance at all. Reid argues that the
material world does indeed exist and that humans do have an awareness of it, an
awareness that relies on belief for validity.”
Shinn opposed Hobbes’ moral skepticism–that morality is grounded in the
social contract rather than nature. On
this point, Shinn also drew polemical material from ethical rationalists such
as Samuel Clarke in order to affirm the immutability and eternal nature of
morals.
[15]Shinn, Essay on the Plan of Salvation, 12.
[16]“But as all truth is to be known in this way, it
appears very desirable to understand what this certain something is, which we
call evidence. If truth is known by
this, and by nothing else; and if we have no power to discover evidence or to
conceive any thing concerning its nature, it is plainly impossible for us to
know any thing concerning what is true and what is false.” Shinn, Essay on the Plan of Salvation,
12-13. For a thorough discussion of
Bacon’s influence on Reid see Alan Wade Davenport, “Evidence and Belief, Common
Sense, and the Science of Mind in the Philosophy of Thomas Reid” (Ph.D. diss.,
American University, 1987).
[17]Broaddus, “Moral Sense Theory in the History of
Rhetoric,” 14-16.
[18]Shinn, Essay on the Plan of Salvation,
43-44. For a recent study of the
influence of Scottish Common-Sense Realism on American evangelicalism, see Mark
Noll, “Common Sense Traditions and American Evangelical Thought,” American
Quarterly 37 (1985), 216-238.
[19]Broaddus offers a critique of the benevolence of God
in the moral utilitarianism of Francis Hutcheson: “From this point-of-view an
action is judged by whether its effects extend to the general interests of
humanity. . . He argues that our sense
of beauty and our moral sense stem from divine goodness; by giving humans the
moral sense God has demonstrated benevolent intent.” Broaddus points to this concept as “a major weakness in
Hutcheson’s philosophy. Hutcheson fails
to distinguish between the motives of an act and the consequences of it.” Broaddus, “Moral Sense Theory in the History
of Rhetoric,” 43.
[20]Shinn, Essay on the Plan of Salvation, 25.
[21]Shinn’s affirmation rests on the moral sense theory,
which posited a moral sense analogous to the physical senses. Since the latter cannot make moral
distinctions, Hutcheson believed God to have endowed humanity with an innate
moral sense. Shinn combined this moral
epistemology with republicanism, and consequently rejected human authority as a
source of moral knowledge. Shinn’s
involvement with Reform Methodism may have been a consequence of his moral
Newtonianism.
[22]The history of philosophy apparently has a legacy of
misreading Hume. As Donald Livingston
states, “Granted that Hume’s philosophy may have had some such negative
influence on our intellectual culture, the question remains whether the
negative theses in question are really in Hume’s work or whether they have been
read into it by a rationalistic mind which is morbidly vulnerable to skepticism
of any kind. In short, the supposedly
destructive Humean legacy may be just the melancholy realization that the
rationalistic program of early modern philosophy . . is impossible, a point
which Hume’s whole philosophy appears designed to show.” Donald W. Livingston, “Introduction,” in Hume:
A Re-Evaluation, ed. Donald W. Livingston and James T. King (New York:
Fordham University Press, 1976), 7.
[23]An excellent discussion of Hume on this issue can be
found in Barry Stroud, “Hume’s Skepticism: Natural Instincts and Philosophical
Reflection,” in The Empiricists: Critical Essays on Locke, Berkeley, and
Hume. ed. Margaret Atherton
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), 229-252.
[24]Shinn, Essay on the Plan of Salvation, 31. Since Shinn’s argument depends so heavily on
Reid’s common sense realism, it also suffers from its weaknesses. As Michaud points out, Reid’s rejection of
idealism because of the latter’s skeptical outcomes is “the best known aspect
of Reid’s philosophy” and in Michaud’s opinion “is also its weakest
aspect.” Reflecting on Reid’s
championship of common sense, Michaud points out “Kant’s rebuke in the Prolegomena”
that “there is no reason why the ordinary man should be trusted rather than the
skeptic–unless we decide to settle philosophical controversies by a vote.” See Yves Michaud, “Reid’s Attack on the
Theory of Ideas: From A Reconsideration of Reid’s Arguments to a Reassessment
of the Theory of Ideas,” in The Philosophy of Thomas Reid, ed. Melvin
Dalgarno and Eric Matthews (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 1989), 14-16.
[25]For example see Shinn, Essay on the Plan of
Salvation, 27. Shinn’s tactics
indicate he did not directly answer Hume; rather, his rhetorical devices
indicate he is supplying Methodist preachers with homiletical ammunition to
encourage common people to reject skepticism and embrace Methodism.
[26]For example, Shinn replaced John Wesley’s concept of a
‘spiritual sense’ with Francis Hutcheson’s ‘moral sense,’ and thus traded
Wesley’s emphasis on prevenient grace for the English Enlightenment’s emphasis
on natural human ability. Shinn deeply
imbibed the spirit of the American Revolution with its “apotheosis of liberty”
[Noll’s term], and concomitant emphasis on “free will.” See Noll, “Common Sense Traditions and
American Evangelical Thought,” 226.
[27]For examples of this device see Shinn, Essay,
39.
[28]Broaddus, “Moral Sense Theory in the History of
Rhetoric,” 49.
[29]Shinn, Essay on the Plan of Salvation, 43. Note his severe critique of Thomas Paine’s Age
of Reason, in which Shinn employed the argument ad absurdum to demonstrate
Paine’s “reason” as “ridicule and conjecture.”
According to Shinn, ‘true reason’ would lead the inquirer to the Truth,
i.e., Christian belief, rather than to skepticism.
[30]Shinn’s eventual rejection of episcopal
authority–first of all Catholicism, and eventually Methodist episcopacy,
stemmed directly from his epistemology.
Access to truth directly through common sense, reason and revelation
made each person the locus of authority on matters of truth–and here is the
philosophical foundation for Jacksonian democracy and Reform Methodism. See Asa Shinn, Appeal to the Citizens of
the United States (Baltimore: Printed by R. J. Matchett, 1827), 5-6. On pages 6-7 Shinn makes it clear that he
did not reject human authority outside the individual, but rather rejected the
assertion of human authority in place of the individual’s right to exercise
his/her reason and to believe the divine revelation in the Bible. Shinn appealed to the anti-Catholic
sentiments of his readers when he criticized Methodist episcopacy. Discussing “the original design of the
Methodists, to ‘spread Scripture [sic] holiness over the land,’” Shinn urged,
“Let it never be forgotten, that the first Christians set out with as pure a
design as we did, and yet, by degrees, the original purpose was slyly
and gradually abandoned; and the deceitful strategem was invented, that
whatever belonged to popery, belonged to “Scripture holiness:”
just as we are now in danger of imbibing the same sentiment, in regard to Methodism. Let it be recollected also, that true
holiness implies a holy willingness that every man should think and
judge for himself, and that every thing in Methodism, which cannot bear
examination, should be given to the moles and the bats.” Asa Shinn, A Brief Review of Doctor Bond’s
“Appeal to the Methodists.”
(Baltimore: Printed by Richard J. Matchett, 1827), 52. The appeal to republican principles and the
critique of Methodist episcopacy as arbitrary and imposed were major reasons
for the formation of the Methodist Protestant Church, according to contemporary
accounts. See R. F. Shinn, A Tribute
to Our Fathers, especially pages 58-71.
[31]Shinn, Essay, 46.
[32]“He would immediately make the astonishing discovery
that the house, which sheltered him from the storm, was nothing but an enormous
idea that contained his whole family in its bosom! Being fully instructed in the metaphysical
transubstantiation, he would understand that on his wedding day he was married
to an idea, and that his children are all young ideas, growing up like olive
plants around (the idea of) his table.” Shinn, Essay, 46-47.
[33]Shinn, Essay, 48.
[34]“But let it be remembered, that those ideal
conjectures, and atheistical conclusions, are as opposite to true reasoning, as
darkness is opposite to light, and truth to hypotheses and absurdity.” Shinn, Essay, 52.
[35]See Shinn, Essay, 53. This statement follows an extensive quotation from Thomas Reid’s Essay
1, chap. vi. page 73. Shinn is
referring to Reid’s Essay on the Active Powers of the Human Mind (1788).
[36]Charles Vereker, Eighteenth-Century Optimism: A
Study of the Interrelations of Moral and Social Theory in English and French
Thought between 1689 and 1789 (Liverpool, UK: Liverpool University Press,
1967), 5.
[37]Vereker, Eighteenth-Century Optimism, 18-19.
Vereker states on page 19, “It was the doctrine of divorce which won the day.”
[38]Vereker, Eighteenth-Century Optimism, 31.
[39]See Shinn, Essay, 54.
[40]Reid compared reason and sense perception and argued
that reason cannot be placed above sense perception, since God is the author of
both. To undermine trust in one human
faculty was to undermine trust in all human faculties. Lehrer summarized Reid’s argument in the
following terms. “Every person has a
natural trust in their faculties, that is, they regard them as trustworthy by
nature. If, however, we call one
faculty into question, perception, for example, then what justification do we
have for trusting another? Hume argued
that the faculty of perception is especially untrustworthy because of the
manner in which the appearances of a physical object, a table for example,
change as we move. Hume concludes that
this shows that we do not perceive the table but only the appearances and,
therefore, are deceived by our senses.
However, the change of appearances, Reid replies, must occur if we do
see the table, and, therefore, rather than leading to the conclusion that we do
not perceive the table, should confirm us in our original conviction that we
perceive what our senses tell us we do.”
Keith Lehrer, Thomas Reid (London and New York: Routledge, 1989),
18.
[41]See Shinn, Essay, 54.
[42]Gauvreau states, “This Newtonian natural theology
reached its height in the works of William Paley, whose Principles of Moral
and Political Philosophy (1785) and Natural Theology (1802) not only
formed the staple of the Cambridge University curriculum but were widely used
in American colleges before 1825.”
Gauvreau, “The Empire of Evangelicalism,” 235.
[43]Shinn, Essay, 57.
[44]“By the last quarter of the Eighteenth Century, the
Enlightenment outlook became the dominant viewpoint of America’s most important
intellectual, political and military leaders. . . It is no exaggeration to say that the Enlightenment gave birth
to America, at least in the sense that it provided the philosophical framework
that informed and inspired the founders of independent America. However, the spirit of the Enlightenment
affected more than a handful of articulate and influential intellectuals. To one degree or another the world view of
the common man [sic] in America was also affected..” Edwards, A Return to Moral and Religious Philosophy in Early
America, 82.
[45]Shinn, Essay on the Plan of Salvation, 59.
[46]Shinn’s Essay demonstrates the early
development of the Methodist emphasis on ‘free will’ in the debate with
Calvinism. The marrow of Shinn’s
argument on this point can be found on pages 393-402. In this section Shinn admits there is no necessary relation
between faith and evidence–evidence does not produce irresistible faith. Rather, the connection between faith and
evidence must take place through an act of the will. This section also
highlights the manner in which moral-sense realists like Shinn explicated
religious experience in terms of small, attainable steps, bridging the gap
between religious experience and sense experience. Later in his career, Shinn published a 403-page treatise on the
goodness of God’s character–a sustained argument against Calvinist perspectives
on the character of God, especially the teaching that God is inscrutable. See Asa Shinn, On the Benevolence and
Rectitude of the Supreme Being (Baltimore, MD: Book Committee of the Methodist Protestant Church; Philadelphia:
James Kay, Jun. & Brother, 1840).
[47]Shinn, Essay on the Plan of Salvation, 405.
[48]Shinn attributed excessive emotionalism to Christians
“who would not think.” For further
characterization see his Essay, 404.